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Abstract 
From the perspective of historical sociology, this essay discusses the social conditions of 
German identification in Hungary after the Second World War. It focuses on the discursive 
logic of collective guilt and justice that was institutionalised in 1944-1948 through the 
empirical analysis of Hungarian nationality politics and public utterances in the context of 
international (European) discourses on the past that have influenced Hungary since the 1980s. 
The essay proposes a historical periodisation according to typical configurations of discursive 
constraints and strategic identifications and thus explains the reasons why the problem arises 
today as the “memory of expulsions”. 
*** 
The “German past” has recently become an important issue both to the social sciences and 
humanities and to the larger (European) political public.1 The social interest in the “German 
past” usually unfolds around the expulsion of around 12-14 million ethnic Germans of East 
Central Europe after the Second World War ended on the continent (Douglas, 2012).  It 
typically arises as “memory”, that is, as a past that hasn’t been kept alive and transmitted so it 
has to be dealt with: researched and commemorated. Or, that is the same, as a past that hasn’t 
passed so it is necessary to deal with it in those societies affected by the historical event. If we 
look through the seven decades that passed after the end of the war we find that this sort of 
problemitisation (Foucault, 1998) is a fairly new phenomenon. The reason why this question 
comes up as “a memory” and especially as the memory of forced migration in the second half 
of the 1940s is the primary object of this study exploring from a historical perspective the 
social conditions of remembering the “German past”. 
                                                             
1 The first version of this essay was presented at the workshop “Pasts and Societies in Central Europe: An 
ethnography of the production of knowledge about the ‘German past’” in Prague, on 3-4 July 2014. I would like 
to thank Réka Marchut for her insightful comments on an earlier version of this text. This paper was supported 
by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
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The complex operations of forced relocation of Germans after the second WW were executed 
according to the modern nation-state paradigm (Gellner, 1983) as an internationally supported 
attempt to resolve and prevent social conflicts on the continent. Although they were executed 
by force of states, they cannot be treated as part of distinct national histories. What is more, as 
an important means in the laboratory of social planning, forced population transfer was one of 
the political repertoire by which the gigantic international attempt to profoundly reorganise 
the geopolitical space of the continent was undertaken (see Mann, 1999, Münz, 2002). The 
fact that forced migration has become another source of conflict in the upcoming years and 
decades is another question. The point here is that besides the history of population 
movements, there is the history of their afterlife: how these operations were addressed, 
discussed, or remembered in the course of time. This metahistory (White, 1973) of the 
“German past” seems to be as complex and complicated as the events of forced relocation 
themselves. The discursive field of addressing the “German past” in Europe scattered into 
pieces both by the iron curtain and by the different capitalist or socialist nation-states. Not to 
speak of the history of knowledge production that determined the way this question was 
raised and dealt with. 
All this makes extremely hard to write the history of the “German past” in a comprehensive 
manner. In the following, I will confine myself to the case of Hungary when looking at how 
public discourse constrained cultural (self-)representation as being of German origin since the 
end of the war. To bridge the gap between this national context and the inherent international 
feature of the expulsions, I will investigate the Hungarian case in a close connection with the 
larger transnational (European) context of the social relation to the past.  
Although the discursive history of constructing the problem of the “German past” has 
apparently epistemological significance, it would be insufficient to reduce the empirical 
investigation to the production of (social scientific) knowledge. It would exclude the 
possibility of studying the social conditions of knowledge production that influences scientific 
interest as well. I will rather be interested in the archaeology of knowledge (Foucault, 1969) 
and the conceptual history (Koselleck, 1985) of the “German question”, that is, the historical 
development of the discourse on Hungarian Germans, commonly called as “Swabians” 
(denomination with also a pejorative connotation since 1945). In order to define precisely my 
object of study, I will examine first the emergence of scientific knowledge production on 
Hungarian Germans since it enables to explore the discursive conditions of speaking publicly 
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about the topic, or in another words, the socio-political problems that academic knowledge 
production intended to deal with. 
 
Questions that academic studies on Hungarian Germans wished to answer 
When scholars, mostly historians, for the first time after the war began to deal with the subject 
of Hungarian Germans around 1970, the main conceptual framework was that of 
nationalities.2 The overall international popularity of this subject, together with the softening 
of ideological control in the country had favourable effects on academic projects dealing with 
German nationality. In parallel with a less ideological assessment of the interwar Horthy-
regime in general, the main topics of academic investigation were the interwar nationality 
politics in Hungary, with great emphasis on cultural and political institutions of ethnic 
Germans and their relations to German imperial politics (Á. Tóth, 2010). Thus one of the 
most acknowledged historians of the “first generation”, Loránt Tilkovszky published on SS 
recruitments in Hungary (Tilkovszky, 1974) and on Volksbund der Deutschen in Ungarn, 
founded in 1938 (Tilkovszky, 1969, 1978). In his volume on Volksbund (see also 
Spannenberger, 2002), the author calls for treating the subject from an unbiased perspective in 
a scientifically objective manner since earlier works addressed it either as the background of 
the resettlements or as part of a Volksbund-apologetics blaming the nationalism of the 
Hungarians (Tilkovszky, 1978, pp.355-356). His earlier work on SS-recruitments also served 
to contribute to the objective judgement of the role of domestic Germans (Tilkovszky, 1974, 
pp.5-10). For Tilkovszky, the question arose thus in relation to the resettlement of the German 
population from Hungary since one of the main justifications of the population transfers 
happened to be the activity of the Volksbund. József Komanovics addressed the subject of 
Volksbund together with the role of the opposing Loyalty Movement among Hungarian 
Germans (Komanovics, 1974).  
Another leading historian of Hungarian Germans during this period, István Fehér begins his 
article titled “Data and facts from the history of Germans of Hungary from the liberation until 
the Potsdam conference” with the factual statement that 220000 people of German nationality 
live in the country. Then he continues: “With their honourable and diligent work these 
Germans take an active part in the struggle for socialism” (Fehér, 1979, p. 39); moreover, he 
                                                             
2 On Hungarian Germans in a Hungarian and German historiographic context, see Seewann, Gerhard – Sitzler, 
Kathrin, 2000, p. 156–180. 
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adds, they consider Hungary as their definitive homeland, and recognise the system as their 
own. Fehér emphasizes that there is a biased picture about the recent past of the German 
nationality necessitating that “we should explore [this past] according to the reality, and 
eliminate nationalist remnants” (Fehér, 1979, p. 39). The author declares that “the past of 
Germans is an inseparable part of Hungarian history”, and that he wishes to provide insight 
into the “most complicated months, days of this past”. In Fehér’s article the German past is 
explicitly addressed (as history) of which the most important period is that of the 
resettlements. The fact that the author commences his argument with the trustworthy and 
honourable nature of the German nationality implies that the biased picture of this category of 
people was believed to be quite the opposite in the 1970s. Fehér, who authors the first 
monographic treatment of resettlements (Fehér, 1988), must have had the same intention of 
giving an objective picture on the role of the Germans in Hungary when researching the 
Loyalty Movement that opposed Hitlerian orientation. He sets off his argument with the 
following: “Even under the cruel Nazi domination there was a healthy part of our domestic 
Germans, loyal to Hungary until the end, who took up the fight against the imperial plans and 
the politics of the Volksbund” (Fehér, 1983, p. 7). Here again, the author speaks against the 
view of Hungarian Germans as the ill part of population that served foreign imperial interests 
before and during the war. The healthy part was loyal to Hungary, and part of the society. The 
concept of nationality enabled precisely to address the non-exclusionary cultural belonging of 
Hungarian Germans that the title of one of Tilkovszky’s books formulated as “German 
nationality – Hungarian patriotism” (Tilkovszky, 1997). Until today, this pattern remained the 
most important one in Hungarian scholarship on the Germans in Hungary, even if scholarly 
vocabulary changed – for instance the concept of nationality was replaced by that of minority 
and identity (on the “double identity” of Hungarian Germans, see Bindorffer, 2005).  
Both Fehér’s remark on the elimination of nationalist remnants, echoing the earlier state 
promoted ideological discourse on eliminating the remnants of fascism, and the insistence on 
the socialist engagement of the German nationality indicate the limits of academic freedom. It 
is also telling that Sándor Balogh’s excellent work on resettlements appeared as a chapter of a 
book entitled “The foreign policy of the Popular Democratic Hungary 1945-1947” (Balogh, 
1982). Despite the ideological constraints influencing public discourse on Hungarian 
Germans, which could result “red tails”3 in the text or in the rhetoric of concealing the 
                                                             
3 “Red tail” is a common expression in the 1970s and 1980s to a visible indication of ideological commitment 
usually in the publication’s paratext to deflect the attention of censors. 
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subject, the issue has become a legitimate and acknowledged field of research in Hungarian 
academia by the 1970s. If we take a closer look at the argumentative strategies, such as 
calling for an “unbiased picture”, a “scientifically objective manner”, the “balanced 
treatment”, the “objective judgement of Germans in Hungary”, or the emphasis on “data and 
facts”, it turns out that these scholarly works intended to change the way Hungarian Germans 
are viewed and treated in the country. They wanted to intervene in the contemporary regime 
of social perception, giving a real, that is, non-ideological and morally-emotionally balanced 
representation of the problem. But what was exactly this problem? Not the memory of the 
expulsions, to be sure, although it had much to do with those historical events. The 
significance attributed to “good Germans”, those who remained loyal to Hungary, and to the 
“guilty ones”, represented by the Volksbund, proves that the “German question” consisted of 
precisely determining the responsibility of the Germans in Hungary before and during the 
Second World War. The history of resettlement was thus subordinated to a moral issue: it is 
addressed as the consequence of the collective punishment of Hungarian Germans. At the 
same time the issue was highly political: in a discursive sense the stake of speaking publicly 
about the history of Hungarian Germans was to resignify (Butler, 1993) the identity category 
of “fascist nation” ideologically and normatively imposed on Hungarians of German origin 
after the war. This identification was at the same time exclusionary and stigmatising: it 
identified the subject both as non-Hungarian and as guilty.  
Indeed, Hungarian historiography on the “German past” was almost obsessed with the 
question of responsibility. Since the beginning, the main issue has been to clarify the 
responsibility and “objectively” assess the role of the different agents: the Swabians, the 
Hungarian state and the Great Powers. As mentioned above, first attempts strove to tone the 
picture of Hungarian Germans officially imposed by the regime and thus precise their 
responsibility during the war. However, the question of to what extent the Hungarian state 
was responsible for the exclusion of its own citizens happened to be as important as the anti-
Hungarian deeds of the Swabians. Ágnes Tóth, one of the leading historians of the field even 
speaks about a widely shared Potsdam-legend dominating early historiography that still 
haunts the scholarship (Á. Tóth, 2010). According to this legend, Hungary executed the 
forced population transfers under the constraint, even command of the winning Allied 
Powers. This statement of course enables to diminish the responsibility of the state. Using 
archival sources not available before, works after the fall of state socialism intended to 
precisely determine the role of the sate in not only the implementation but also in the decision 
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of excluding “the Swabians” from the country and the political community. Recent works 
argue that instead of being compulsory dictates to Hungary, resolutions of the Potsdam 
agreement were rather tended to be interpreted as such by Hungarian authorities (Marchut, 
2014, pp.185-205). The great emphasis put on the question of responsibility in historiography 
was manifested in the decades long debate on the appropriate concept of what happened 
between 1946 and 1948: resettlement, expulsion or population transfer? Today in the 
academic field there seems to be a consensus on the responsibility of the agents, primarily of 
Hungary, but the same cannot be said for the larger public where for instance judgements 
radically differ among Hungarian Germans in Hungary and in Germany.  
In order to situate scholarly knowledge production in the larger context of public discourse on 
Hungarian Germans, in the following I will focus on the history of the power relation between 
discursive constraints and strategies of identification as German in Hungary since the end of 
the war. I will rely on two empirical levels of discourse. On the one hand, I will take into 
consideration debates on Hungarian Germans, personal accounts of the past and public 
activities in those historical periods in which there more or less existed a political public 
sphere. On the other, I will analyse the historically changing state policy towards Hungarian 
Germans. This latter is important for those historical periods lacking political public sphere, 
and also for determining the room officially accorded for resisting stigmatising identification. 
As it will be shown later, until the end of state socialism the exclusive agent of nationality 
policy was the state since in the Eastern Bloc there was no regional or bilateral regulation on 
national minorities (Föglein, 2000, pp.92-121).  
In this study public utterances – whether scholarly or not – are interpreted as strategic acts in 
the history of the discourse about Hungarian Germans. The main constraint influencing 
German identification, as the above analysis of the early historiography shows, was that of the 
application of the collective guilt principle. I will thus focus only on the discursive logic of 
collective guilt and justice in the construction and maintenance of cultural belonging: on how 
the identity category of “guilty German” was imposed on the one hand, and on strategies of 
opposing this stigmatising identification on the other (on this approach see Zombory, 2012). 
First I discuss the process through which the principle of collective responsibility was 
institutionalised in Hungary. This is what will be later addressed in different ways as the 
question of Hungarian Germans. Second, I define periods in the history of the discourse 
characterising each one by a particular configuration of normative constraints and opposing 
strategies of identification. 
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Institutionalising the collective guilt principle (1944-48) 
The collective punishment of the German population in Hungary had already begun before 
representatives of the Provisional National Government of Hungary signed the armistice 
agreement with the Allied Powers on the 20th January 1945. The Red Army executed a 
punitive action against the Germans during November and December 1944 when several tens 
of thousands people were taken from Hungary to lagers of the Soviet Union (Á. Tóth, 1995). 
On December 22 1944 the Soviet military command ordered (no. 0066) the mobilization of all 
active persons of German origin in Hungary for public work and reconstruction work 
immediately behind the front (on forced labour of Germans in the Soviet Union, see 
Konaszov – Terescsuk, 2004). This operation was executed with the active cooperation of the 
Hungarian public administration and also with the approval of the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America sanctioned later by the Tehran agreement. 
For the new Hungarian political elite in 1944-45, as for the whole of Europe at the time, 
forced population transfer was completely legitimate and acceptable as a geopolitical means 
of stabilisation. As a matter of fact, the Hungarian government, consisted of former 
oppositional parties (on the so called “coalition period” in Hungarian history, see Palasik, 
2011) condemning German orientation and Hungarian involvement in the war, attached the 
principle of punishing Germans accusable for committing war crimes to other different 
political issues. Thus the Agrarian reform in spring 1945 was the first in the row of state 
measures by which rights of the Swabians were deprived as a means of solving other 
problems of domestic and foreign policy (Á. Tóth, 1993, 1995). Instead of their role during 
the war, the reason behind the inland resettlement and internment of Hungarian Germans was 
rather the need to provide sufficient land for poor peasantry and for Hungarian refugees 
coming to the newly reduced territory of the country.  
As for the resettlement of the population with German origin to Germany, the Hungarian 
government’s behaviour was ambivalent (on the history of resettlements see also Zinner, 
2004). The idea was neither new, since the conception of repopulating Germans from 
Hungary to Germany had been circulating in pre-1944 Hungary (see the Heim ins Reich 
policy; on evacuation plans of Germans from Hungary to Germany, see Tilkovszky 1978, 
pp.336-354), nor unique, since in other countries, most importantly in Poland and in 
Czechoslovakia, the resettlement of the Germans was also on the political agenda. The 
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Hungarian government and the political parties in power unanimously supported the plans of 
punishing the Swabians by way of resettlement, they only differed in their attitude toward 
how to define the population concerned, and toward the applicability of the collective 
responsibility principle. The ambivalence is clearly visible in the case of the inter-party 
conference of the political forces on 14 May 1945. On the one hand, the parties adopted the 
principle that “There is no Swabian question in Hungary, only the question of German 
fascists” which implied that the judgement of the people to be resettled would happen 
according to the assessment of individual political deeds. On the other hand, the same parties 
(with the exception of the social democrats) at the same conference agreed upon the fact of 
resettlement and the need to expand the population concerned as much as possible. This 
ambivalence, beyond the minimal ideological differences in the judgement of the principle of 
collective punishment, was largely due to the fact that Hungarian politicians were aware of 
the Czechoslovak plans of a Hungarian-Slovak population exchange. Thus the government in 
the international political scene did not want to suggest that it applies the same collective 
responsibility principle against the German population that it confronts in relation to the 
Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.  
Certainly the Potsdam conference changed a lot since from then on it was possible to shift the 
responsibility to the Great Powers. Accordingly, the resolution of the Ministerial Council on 
13 August defined the population to be resettled according to German nationality and not to 
individual acts before and during the war (Á. Tóth 1995). This circle, around 303 thousand 
people, due to Soviet pressure4 was extended to the population of German mother tongue, 
around 478 thousand. On 22 December the Ministerial Council adopted the resolution of Imre 
Nagy, the Minister of the Interior, which based on the principle of collective guilt 
(independent ministers, and those from the Social Democratic and the Smallholders’ Party 
opposed) (Á. Tóth, 1995). The prime ministerial decree M. E. 12330/1945 regulating the 
resettlement of the German population of Hungary in Germany was issued on 29 December 
1945. The scope of the law fell to those who declared to be of German nationality or of 
German mother tongue at the 1941 census; to those who changed their already Magyarised 
name to German; and to former members of Volksbund and SS. A later resolution ordered on 
the deprivation those who had been resettled of Hungarian citizenship. The resettlement 
process started in January 1946 and ended in 1948. 
                                                             
4 In contrast to Poland and Czechoslovakia, in Hungary the issue of resettlement was assured to the Allied 
Control Commission under soviet direction. 
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The period between 1944 and 1948 is marked by the process through which Hungarians 
defined as Swabian were deprived of rights and physically excluded from the country. The 
national press unanimously supported the resettlement of Hungarian Germans as the one and 
only resolution of the “Swabian question”, and similarly to the political elite, only the 
principle of collective guilt was debated by some (see Zielbauer, 1996; Marchut 2009). In 
January 1946 when resettlements from Hungary began, only 26 intellectuals expressed their 
opposition in a public declaration (Magyar Nemzet, 18 January 1946). The harshest promoters 
of the collective punishment were without fail the papers of the communist party and the 
National Peasant Party. On 18 April, for example, the first spoke in the name of all the 
Hungarians in whose eyes the Swabians are the „eternal enemy of freedom”, the „foreign 
gendarmes who are always ready to stab the dagger from behind into the heart of the nation”. 
The journal declared that there was no place, and mustn’t be, for the „Swabian traitors of the 
homeland”, and that the freedom of the Hungarian nation would not be assured until the 
nation gets rid of „these settler soldiers of German barbarism” (Szabad Nép, 18 April, 1945). 
The newspaper of the peasant party formulated as follows: „There is no hope that the two 
people could get along peacefully with each other. One of them must go, and there is no 
question which one is that… Swabians don’t merit mercy… Let them get out of here! – as 
they came: with one pack on their back.” (Szabad Szó, 2 April 1945) The paper of the 
Smallholders’ Party, while opposing the principle of collective punishment, with reference to 
a speech of the party’s Secretary-General, declared that “Indeed, mostly the Swabians are 
responsible for the crimes recently committed” and focused on resettlement plans from an 
operative perspective: “it won’t be without doubt an easy task to cut half million people out 
from the body of the nation” (Kis Újság 18 April 1945).  
I took these few examples to give an insight into the rhetoric of the national press that 
implemented a discourse in which the category of “Swabian” not only equals foreigner to the 
Hungarian nation but also guilty, barbarian, parasite. In general, the public discourse on 
Swabians was imbedded into the one on post-war national reconstruction and democracy 
according to which neither can be realised without the resettlement and punishment of the 
Hungarian population with German origin. Although not applied literally by all the domestic 
political agents, the idea of “fascist nation” and thus the practice of public stigmatisation of 
“the Swabians” became essentially accepted in this period. Normative public discourse on 
Hungarian Germans, together with the governmental measures depriving of their rights, did 
not tolerate opposing public German (self-)identification. The voice of Hungarian Germans 
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was literally withdrawn, and thus their political subjectivity. There was no room for them, 
neither in the political community nor on the territory of Hungary.  
 
1. Silence (1949-1956) 
The Stalinist period that began with the communist takeover and the implementation of the 
one party system is paradoxically marked by the gradual legal rehabilitation of Hungarian 
Germans. The new constitution in 1949 regulated the situation of the nationalities on the 
highest legal level. It declared that all citizens of the country, regardless of their nationality, 
are equal before the law, any discriminative differentiation according to the belonging to a 
nationality is legally punished, and the People’s Republic of Hungary assures to any 
nationality the “possibility to the education and to the cultivation of their national culture in 
their mother tongue” (quoted by Föglein, 2000, p. 104). However, these rights were individual 
and not collective rights, and what was stated de jure did not mean de facto a right for the 
nationalities.  
The regime was realistic enough to not denying totally the actual existence of nationalities in 
Hungary, moreover, it systematically applied the national principle as a source of political 
legitimacy (Mevius, 2005). There existed thus a Stalinist nationality policy that in many 
respects contradicted to the official ideology about the “socialist man”. As the quotation 
above from the 1949 constitution well demonstrates, actual nationality policy was restricted to 
the legal use of mother tongue on the public domains of education and cultivation of culture. 
The paradoxical relation to the national principle is manifested in the regime’s ambivalent 
attitude toward the issue of nationality education. It did not encourage or support the 
establishment of nationality schools in localities without such institutions, and at the same 
time it intended to prevent the depopulation of the existing ones. As a report for the ministry 
of religion and education put it in 1949: “this is what our interests dictate concerning our 
relations to the neighbouring countries, and the regulation of schooling of the Hungarians 
living there” (quoted by Tilkovszky, 1998, p. 144). While the Hungarian state socialist regime 
with one eye looked at the future classless society, with the other, it regarded the Hungarian 
population in the neighbouring countries with a strong national interest.  
Accordingly, nationality politics that is, political activity of the nationalities was 
“provisionally” possible in the institutional framework of the Nationality Associations 
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(Nemzeti Szövetség). After the communist takeover, the idea came up that these organisations 
should be abolished, since workers should be organised on class basis and not according to 
nationalities but, fearing that this would lead to similar measures against the Hungarians in the 
neighbouring countries, the regime tolerated the already existed associations while preventing 
them to form local organisations (Tilkovszky, 1998). The associations were strictly controlled 
from above and used for “cultural work” and “political education” among the nationalities. In 
other words, associations of nationalities served as a means of political control and 
ideological mobilisation for the regime – and not as bottom-up institutions of self-
organisation. 
For Hungarian Germans residing in the country, the situation was even more complicated 
since they did not have legitimate existence neither as Hungarians nor as a nationality in 
1949. Between that year and 1956, however, the laws depriving them of their rights were 
gradually withdrawn. Most importantly, their Hungarian citizenship was reinstated in 1950 by 
a decree of the ministerial council (no. 84/1950) which stated: “All those persons falling 
under the force of resettlement, who were no resettled, and also those whose resettlement was 
implemented but at the time of this decree’s entering into force are residing in Hungary (...), 
are Hungarian citizens, and enjoy in every respect equal rights with the other of the People’s 
Republic of Hungary.” (Quoted by Á. Tóth, 2008, p. 55). Other similar measures followed, 
assuring rights to the German nationality: the right of using mother tongue in justice (1951-
52) and in public administration (1957), voting right (1953), among others (see Föglein 2000, 
p. 92-121, Tilkovszky, 1998).  
The most important element of the nationality policy in the period was the school program. 
The German nationality education program, started in the school year of 1951-52, was 
gradually established until 1958 (see in detail Föglein, 2006, Fehér, 1993, pp.156-157, 163-
164). According to a document of the Ministry of Education, the number of primary schools 
in which German language was taught increased to 75 by the school year of 1954/55, to 100 
one year later. There were no schools teaching in German, though (Tilkovszky 1998).  
The year of 1955 can be treated as the end of the period in which legal and partial political 
rehabilitation of the German nationality was realised. Following the resolution of the Political 
Committee of the communist party (Party of Hungarian Workers, MDP), the Cultural 
Association of German Workers of Hungary was created in that year. The nationality 
association of Hungarian Germans was to pursue, according to the Political Committee, the 
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main goal of “drawing German workers in the building of socialism” and “organising cultural 
activities” (quoted by Föglein, 2000, p. 86).  
I called the Stalinist period paradoxical because the gradual legal rehabilitation of Hungarian 
Germans did not go hand in hand with political and ideological rehabilitation. On the one 
hand, the official ideology followed the principle of automatism according to which even if 
national categories existed at present, they would disappear with the complete realisation of 
socialism. The theory and practice of automatism was not an anti-nationality policy but a 
“peculiar Hungarian branch of Hungarian nationalism” that represented the attitude of “letting 
them be they will vanish anyway” (Fehér, 1993, p. 139). This made political representation of 
nationality interests impossible in the public. Moreover, until 1955, Hungarian Germans were 
excluded even from the system of nationality associations that was supposed to 
institutionalise nationality politics. On the other hand, the discourse on “fascist nation”, 
previously a characteristic of the left wing parties, acquired the status of official ideology in 
this period. Apart from the principle of automatism, this constituted the main discursive 
constraint of German identification. Although the system assured legitimate political 
existence to individuals who had fallen under the scope of the resettlement decree, it did not 
permit to represent political interests of the German nationality.  
 
2. Cultivation (1957-1983) 
Associations of nationalities represented the political interests of the state party toward the 
minority population and not the interests of nationalities toward the state. Yet the formation of 
the German Association marks a milestone in the discourse on the “German question” since it 
permitted to undertake some sort of nationality politics for those who had previously been 
deprived of any kind of political subjectivity. According to the resolution of the Political 
Committee of the state-party (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, MSZMP) in 1958, the tasks 
of the associations were the following: fostering “political mass work” (that is political-
ideological mobilisation) among the nationalities in order to include them into the conscious 
work of building socialism; spreading “socialist patriotism”; and as “social organisations”, 
associations had to focus their activity on the “political and cultural enlightening work with 
socialist content” (quoted by Föglein, 2000, p. 88). Thus the public domain of nationality 
policy towards Hungarian Germans remained, as in the earlier period in the case of other 
nationalities, restricted to education and language use.  
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Although the system of the four nationalities’ associations (South Slavic, Slovak, Romanian 
and German) did not change until the fall of the regime, important transformations began in 
the 1960s. In 1960 associations could for the first time organise their annual congress in 
which they could raise problems regarding the situation of the respective nationality inside the 
strictly reduced and party-controlled domain of political field. According to the report on the 
first congress, submitted to the Central Committee of the party, “in the associations of 
nationalities the view tends to be disappearing according to which the task of the associations 
is to arouse national self-consciousness” (quoted by Föglein, 2000, p. 89). The same report 
states that their main function is to “transmit the word of the party and the government to their 
workers of nationality” (quoted by Tilkovszky 1998, p. 154). Yet it is in the 1960s when 
public representation of folkloristic values of nationalities became general – and not only in 
local contexts, since the state formed the central folkloristic dance group with the contribution 
of the nationality associations. The central dance group was to represent both in the country 
and abroad that the situation of nationalities is good in Hungary, their folk culture is 
flourishing – yet in reality the assimilation of nationalities intensified (Tilkovszky, 1998). 
Reports of the associations after the congress in 1964 prove that their activity did not expand 
the boundaries of “culture” defined as language use and folk customs: they organised fairy 
tale hours of mother tongue for children, clubs for adults to practice the language of 
nationality and so on. They also started activities to preserve local traditions, and to spread 
knowledge on the culture and tradition of the homeland (that is Hungary).  
This of course enabled to smuggle some elements of nourishing minority traditions into the 
activities of nationality associations in which even folkloristic sections were formed in 1970-
72. From 1969, the associations of nationalities could directly elect their deputies to the 
congress, and acquired rights of consultation on different political levels. Gradually new 
possibilities of self-organisation opened up, and the period until the end of the system is 
marked by a moderate but continual decentralisation. 
In 1968, the nationality policy of Hungary considerably changed. It has become obvious to 
the regime that assimilation shouldn’t be urged among the nationalities (Seewann, 1990, 
1994). A resolution of the Political Committee of the party, adopted in the same year, defined 
the two main problems of nationality policy in nationalism and assimilation (on the resolution 
see Föglein, 2000, pp.79-84). According to the new nationality political concept, the principle 
of automatism should be abandoned and an important new function of the nationalities is to 
build, maintain and nurture relations with the adjacent countries, especially with their 
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Hungarian populations. This new concept was called the “bridge role” of nationalities, 
referring to the “Leninian” nationality policy instead of the “Stalinian” one (Tilkovszky, 
1998), and was supposed to represent the national interest of the Hungarian population in the 
neighbouring countries. Besides the pressure of Hungarian intellectuals on the party 
leadership, this turn was due to important international developments (the UNESCO 
conference in Helsinki, 1972, the UN-seminar in Ohrid, 1974, and the Final Act (Helsinki 
Act) of OSCE, 1975, see Föglein, 2000: 93-94, Tilkovszky, 1998: 162) which at least in 
principle called for the protection of minority rights and thus acknowledged that minority 
questions do not exclusively belong to the country of residence.  
As a result, Secretary-General János Kádár declared at the XIth congress of the Hungarian 
Socialist Workers' Party in 1975 that „Our aim is that the German, Slovak, South-Slavic, 
Romanian and other nationalities living in our homeland, and the population of Hungarian 
nationality in the neighbouring countries form a bridge between our countries” (quoted by 
Tilkovszky, 1998, p. 163). The so called “bridge role” principle in Hungarian nationality 
policy aimed at indirectly representing the national-ethnic interests of Hungarians in the 
adjacent countries by demonstrating the “right treatment” of nationalities on Hungarian 
territory. For Hungarian Germans this meant, together with results of Willy Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik, the possibility to build and maintain relations with the German states.  
In legal terms the end of the Kadar-era could be located in 1989 when the new constitution 
declared national minorities as constitutional elements of the state, it assured their collective 
participation in public life, the possibility to nurture their own culture, language, and the right 
to education in the mother tongue. This periodisation would be misleading however, since 
significant transformations, both regarding nationality policy and public discourse, began 
already in the beginning of the 1980s. For instance, education in the language of nationality 
became possible in 1985, and it was the state-party that started drawing up the law on 
nationalities that was adopted in 1993. The change of political regime in 1989 doesn’t 
constitute a definitive rupture: although political measures of retrieval were taken afterwards, 
in discursive terms the transformation had begun much earlier. 
1983 seems to be a more significant milestone in the discourse on Hungarian Germans when 
György Aczél (secretary of the Central Committee and actually the director of cultural life in 
Hungary in 1956-1988) gave a speech at the congress of the Association of Hungarian 
Germans, condemning the principle of collective responsibility and the way the German 
15 
 
community had been made into scapegoats. He explicitly denied the existence of “fascist 
peoples” (quoted by Tilkovszky, 1998, p. 170) and thus publicly broke with the conception 
according to which the treatment of Hungarian Germans after the war was justified and right. 
This gesture before the locally elected deputies of Hungarian Germans put an end to the 
official ideological imposition of the “fascist nation” label.  
In sum, official nationality policy remained ambivalent in the sense that the Hungarian 
national category was institutionalised by the state („socialist patriotism”, symbolic 
representation of Hungarians in the adjacent countries, etc.), but the public use of national-
ethnic categories that is, “nationalism”, was forbidden and normatively sanctioned. While 
institutional regulation of nationality policy gradually gave more and more space for public 
German identification, particularly after 1968, at the same time it still kept the stigmatizing 
label of “fascist nation” justified. It is not surprising then, that time to time the party faced the 
problem of “political passivity” of Hungarian Germans in comparison with other nationalities.  
Yet for the first time after the war public (self-)representation, a sort of quasi-political 
subjectivity became possible for Hungarian Germans. As argued earlier, a significant strategy 
of dealing with the “German past” on the national level was scholarly historiography that was 
indirect, allusive and non-memorial. Apart from scholar knowledge production, the main 
strategy of opposing stigmatising categorisation was articulating German belonging in the 
domain restricted to language use, education and nurturing folkloristic traditions. Because of 
the concept of “culture” enacted by the regime, this strategy can be called cultivation. It was 
thus apolitical in the sense that the use of German identity category in a public and collective 
manner to attain political goals was not allowed. Accordingly, cultivation only enabled the 
indirect and allusive dealing with the “German past” on a local level (on local contexts see for 
example Bindorffer, 2001, Eiler, 2011, Kovács 2004a, pp.131-281). Uncovering and 
practicing local ethnographic traditions together with a reduced but allowed use of German 
language could legitimate the existence of Hungarian Germans in the locality and could 
attribute “cultural values” to the German identity category and thus to oppose collective 
stigmatisation. However, it could not contribute to raise the problems of previous 
wrongdoings or to public material and symbolic reparations. The “German question” 
constructed through the strategy of cultivation did in a certain way address the past but only 
as education by presenting nostalgic folk traditions.  
 
16 
 
3. Cultural heritage (1980s – 1990s) 
Besides the possibility of nationality politics in a self-determined, collective and institutional 
form according to the new constitution in1989 and the regulations of the 1993 law on the 
“rights of national and ethnic minorities”, the period of the 1980s and 1990s is marked by the 
interaction of two social historical processes. The first is the continual existence of the 
discursive configuration of the Kádár-period, the second is the integration of Hungary into the 
European political space. The Hungarian state’s relation to its population now called national 
and ethnic minorities is still characterised by the previously dominant strategy of 
internationally presenting the “right treatment” of nationalities in order to influence the policy 
of the neighbouring states toward their Hungarian minorities. The only difference is that this 
strategy is institutionalised on governmental and bilateral level, and Hungarian politicians and 
experts had the inclination in the 1990s to speak of a “Hungarian model” of security policy in 
the framework of which the questions of national minorities were raised (J. Tóth, 2000).  
As for the integration of Hungary into the European political space, two developments should 
be mentioned. One is the political turn around the 1970s in the western part of Europe by 
which the orientation of political investment to change social reality shifted from the future to 
the past. This modernisational change is usually demonstrated with the opposition of history 
and memory, and with such new key concepts as presentism, musealisation, patrimony, or 
archive (Hartog, 2002, Huyssen, 2003, Nora 1993, 2011, Rousso, 2007). The influence of this 
change on how political and social problems are raised and treated cannot be underestimated. 
Social problems have become problems of memory, and political action aims to change the 
relation societies maintain with the past. Another, interrelated development of European 
political space is the one by which the memory of the Holocaust, after having been detached 
from its historical and geographical context and forming a transnational point of reference 
(Alexander, 2012, Levy-Sznaider, 2006), has become the central element of the founding 
myth of Europe as a would-be political community (Probst, 2006). The core European values 
are expressed and enforced through Holocaust-memory with close relation to the human 
rights discourse.  
The integration of Hungary into the European normative order meant the interaction between 
the existing discourse on the “German question”, cultivation and scholar knowledge 
production on the one hand, and the regime of commemoration and the normative Holocaust-
memory on the other. Results of this interaction are clearly visible in the scholarly field where 
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the oral history approach and the topic of the memory of resettlements gained particular 
relevance during the 1980s-1990s. The commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the 
beginning of the resettlements in 1986 was an important event that resulted in the scientific 
conference held in Budapest the next year at which not only historians from Hungary and 
Germany participated but also representatives of organisations of expellees (Hambuch, 1988). 
The problematisation of the “German question” as memory of the resettlements became 
dominant during this period.  
The question of Hungarian Germans, with the topic of resettlements in its centre, stepped into 
the wider national public space. The Hungarian parliament in 1990 adopted two resolutions 
on political reparation and relief of Hungarian Germans: one “on the remedy of the collective 
injuries of the German minority of Hungary” (no. 35/1990), the other “on the remedy of 
injuries of Hungarian citizens deported to retrieval work in the Soviet Union”, or convicted by 
tribunals of the Soviet Union (no. 36/1990). The Hungarian parliament declared that the 
expulsions to the Soviet Union and the resettlements were wrongful procedures violating 
human rights; that innocent people suffered due to their belonging to nationality; and 
expressed its compassion and solidarity to the relatives. Hungarian politics adopted the 
conceptualisation of Europeanised Holocaust memory when interpreting the resettlements as 
human right violations whose subject (and their descendants) are suffering individuals. The 
commemorations on the 50th anniversary of the beginning of resettlements in 1996 even more 
expanded the scope of the subject in the national public sphere. This year is the symbolic peak 
of the period for numerous reasons: the popularity of the oral history approach and the interest 
in local histories in scholarship, the political interest on national scale, the plurality of 
commemorative actions both on local and national level, etc.  
Instead of interpreting this process as the “surfacing of the topic previously suppressed and 
dealt with as a taboo” (Á. Tóth, 2010, p. 19), by giving an example of “memory work” from 
the 1980s, I rather focus on how normative constraints of the discourse transformed in the 
course of history. The following excerpt is taken from a home-made recording entitled 
“Presentation of the religious and everyday life of the native population settled in [name of 
the village close to Budapest], which I received on CD in the early 2000s from one of my 
interviewees: 
“On the 25th of (...) 1987 a small group was gathered, M. E. and his wife, at D. H.’s place. 
Years ago this house was the home of W. L. and his wife E. T. It was here that T. T. bandaged 
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the head wound of General Görgey in 1848.5 There is written documentation of this. Since 
then the building has been altered. The members of this group would like to look up and 
gather our ancestors’ customs, songs, and prayers. In an exhibition in 1984 we showed the 
old objects our ancestors used and made. Unfortunately we are not able to maintain a 
permanent exhibition, because there is not an appropriate location for the objects. 
[Participants introduce themselves] In the coming work we will rely completely on tradition, 
which dispenses with all manner of preparation. We gathered voluntarily at the sound of one 
hesitant word, and we try to convey what has remained of our forefathers’ lives and of our 
past.” 
In the semi-public gathering of people formerly experiencing exclusion from the Hungarian 
political community and expulsion from Hungary are presenting to each other how everyday 
life looked like before. As the title of the recording shows, the subject of discussion is not “the 
topic” of resettlement. The title labels the category of people in question neither as German 
nor as Swabian but as “native population”. Belonging to the locality is reassured by this 
claim, as by the strategy to represent familial history as an integral part of the canonised 
Hungarian national past: the “ancestors” took active part in the Hungarian national civic 
revolution and freedom fight in 1848-49 – against the Habsburgs.  
The semi-public “memory work” of the group aiming at re-signifying the identity category by 
which their Hungarian belonging was denied and their German origin stigmatised, is 
exercised in the framework of cultivation: gathering and exhibiting the “ancestors’ customs, 
songs, and prayers”. Presenting ethnographic values aimed to counterbalance cultural 
devaluation through stigmatization. Yet it is important that later on the recording is distributed 
in a digitalized form. This refers to the process through which, particularly with the 
integration of Hungary into the European political space, techniques and technologies of 
memory such as museum exhibitions, book publishing, video and audio recordings, etc. 
became available to a wider public.  
In the 1980s-90s discursive constraints influencing utterance considerably transformed as 
well. In the liberated memory political space of Hungary, determined by commemoration and 
Holocaust-memory, actors of different group categories claimed public recognition aiming at 
material or symbolic reparation of past suffering. The main strategy of political practice has 
become presenting the memory of past sufferings through the practice of witness testimony 
(Wieviorka, 2002) of the victim. In the rivalry of the victims that often culminated in the 
competitive calculation of suffering for instance by the number of murders, the subject 
                                                             
5 Artúr Görgey, military leader during the civic revolution and freedom fight of Hungary in 1848-1849, got his 
famous head wound on July 2, 1849 in the Battle of Ács. 
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position of being of German origin was determined by the categorisation of the Holocaust-
memory paradigm: perpetrator, bystander, and victim. By the 1990s, strategies of German 
identification had to deal with the normative constraint of subjectification as perpetrator. In 
some cases, this configuration resulted in the crisis of witness testimony. One of my 
interviewees in the early 2000s, previously taken to forced labour in the Soviet Union, closed 
the narration of his life course with the following remark: 
“That’s how I’ve struggled through life. The resettlement didn’t find me at home, as I said, 
they took me to the ... Soviet Union. I was there five years. --- I have to pause a bit here, 
because every time they ask me, always about this captivity, here everyone expects me to tell 
tales of horror. Well now I can’t tell tales of horror, I’m telling the truth.” 
 
According to the narrator’s expectation, the listener (and the public) wants to hear about the 
resettlement as the “true” historical trauma of Hungarian Germans. The truth of the life story 
account paradoxically contrasts the normative constraints of the commemorative paradigm pf 
Holocaust-memory about witness testimonies of traumatic subjects. The interviewee time to 
time relates his story to the norms defined by the new regime of memory, as in the case when 
he speaks about being put in the wagon, “but quite sparsely”, or when he says:  
“The folk with me… Those who tell it like, minus fifty degrees, minus forty degrees… we never 
experienced that. No. They always, someone always adds some horror. What the purpose of 
that is, I don’t know, I’m not adding it. Because I declare that that camp --- it wasn’t a gulag. 
We weren’t taken to a gulag, but to a camp.” 
 
Refusing to assume the subject position of the traumatised victim, the crisis of testifying to 
reality is clearly manifested by the fact that the verbal narration breaks and the interview ends 
with the interpretation of autobiographical paintings on which the interviewee re-presents 
everyday reality that is no longer there, to which testimony can make reference. In a picture, 
displaying the immediate surroundings of the birthplace of the narrator, the absence of subject 
position is represented in the application of a perspective that could be assumed only if the 
house of the interviewee didn’t exist (see detailed analysis of the interview and of others, 
Zombory, 2012, pp.151-211).  
How to represent publicly the suffering of the “perpetrator nation”? One way is what I called 
elsewhere self-musealisation (Zombory, 2012) according to which a German past is 
constructed as cultural heritage connected to Hungary. Presenting the familial-personal past as 
part of the history of the locality, for instance by exhibiting family photos and objects in the 
house of birth to a wider public, constitutes a strategic way to present publicly the cause of 
collective stigmatisation, that is the identity category, as culturally valuable, belonging to 
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Hungarian national time and space. At the same time, this sort of localisation permits 
representing “us” as different Hungarians, because of “our” local distinct culture. 
 
4. Victimisation (2000s-) 
Since 1989, the most important process of restructuration of European geopolitical space was 
without fail the enlargement of the EU. The fact that countries of the former Eastern Bloc, 
including those where Germans had been expulsed from, take part in the institutionalised 
political space of Europe, considerably changed the way we look at the forced relocation of 
Germans after the war. It fuelled the debate about the extent to which state and national 
border regulations can be exposed to criticism. The issue of expulsion came to the forefront as 
an important element of European history whose public re-evaluation is more than necessary. 
The fall of the iron curtain and the European enlargement had considerable impact also on 
scholarly research of the German past, most importantly the application of a transnational 
framework together with international cooperation. The new European discursive space 
enabled to shed light on the fact that forced migration movements following the war cannot be 
exclusively treated as national phenomena. In a sense the issue has been Europeanised. In 
historiography, the subject of expulsions started to be dealt with the holocaust in the same 
theoretic framework of forced migration (Schlögel, 2003).  
In the wider European political public an extensive and animated debate started on the 
relation of the memory of expulsions to that of the Holocaust as the case of the controversy in 
the early 2000s over the intentions to create a museum, a “Centre against Expulsion” 
(Zentrum gegen Vertreibung), well exemplifies. Parallel to these developments an important 
transformation of German memory politics began, with more emphasis on German 
victimhood and suffering because of Allied bombing during the war, socialist regime, and 
expulsions. 
In this context the memory of expulsions has been adopted into the representational canon of 
Europeanised Holocaust-memory (Levy-Sznaider, 2005). No longer treated as “revenge” or as 
the “logical consequence” of the Holocaust, it has become conceived and remembered as 
trauma. Karl Schlögel, for example, argues that he catastrophe of losing the “German East” is 
as central in recalling the history of Germans as the murder of the Jews or the war at the 
eastern front (Schlögel, 2003). The German historian even speaks of a “complex of 
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expulsion” in Germany that has to be come to terms with in a collective and public way in 
order to heal.  
Apart from sporadic reactions (e.g. Kovács, 2004b) the waves of these debates did not really 
reach the Hungarian public. In the early 2000s when the questions of European geopolitics, 
connected to the ever closer accession of eastern countries, were raised regionally as the 
future status of the so called Benes-decrees that provided legal basis for the resettlement of 
the “Sudeten Germans” and ethnic Hungarians from Czechoslovakia, Hungary made claims 
only on behalf of the Hungarians of Slovakia.  
A strategy of victimisation of Hungarian Germans is hardly observable in Hungary. Although 
commemorating the resettlements does not anymore poses such difficulties as in the 1990s, 
the jubilee commemorations of the resettlements in 2006 did not radically differ from those in 
1996. The discursive relation of Hungarian Germans and the state seems to be balanced. The 
memory of resettlements has become included into the official national imagery when in 
2012, the Hungarian Parliament declared 19 January, the they when the first train transporting 
Hungarian Germans left the country in 1946, as the commemorative day of “deportation and 
expulsion of Germans of Hungary”. It seems that the state strives to shift national 
responsibility since, instead of the role of the Hungarian state administration, the 
parliamentary resolution refers to the “realisation of the Allied Control Council’s resolution 
on 20 November 1945” (originally the parliament intended to create this day as the 
commemorative day of the resettlements). It uses the Europeanised vocabulary when saying 
that the “expulsions” were “severely violating human rights”.  
 In comparison with Poland or the Czech Republic, the erection of public memorials of 
resettlements did not entail national political debates although local conflicts occurred.6 “In 
contrast to the radical tone and formative language of political martyr memorials erected since 
the regime change, instead of complaining the injuries suffered and martyrdom, the message 
of monuments of resettlement in Hungary was rather making gently aware of the tribulations 
and the acceptance of the community of fate with the majority nation, the fate which was 
divided by force in 1945.” (Boros, 2005, p. 110) The construction of the German past remains 
                                                             
6 See for instance the controversy about the monument on national (that is, Hungarian) fidelity erected in 
Ágfalva, a village near Sopron. In 1921 the region as a whole voted for belonging to Hungary in a referendum, 
however Ágfalva where the majority of population was of German mother tongue, voted for Austria. See e.g. 
http://derstandard.at/1323222962378/BurgenlandUngarn-Neun-Orte-ein-Stein-ein-Denkanstoss  
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in the national framework, localised in every case as a distinctive part of Hungarian cultural 
heritage.  
 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of historical sociology, this essay discussed the social conditions of 
German identification in Hungary after the Second World War. It argues that the study of the 
problem as production of knowledge about the “German past” is partial because of two 
reasons. First, the production of knowledge about the subject that in Hungary began in the 
1970s was situated in the long term history of discourse on Hungarian Germans after the war 
that determined the conditions of scholarly work. Second, the problematisation of the 
“German question” as memory is itself a historical development that has to be explained. As a 
consequence, this study focused on the discursive logic of collective guilt and justice that was 
institutionalised in 1944-1948 through the empirical analysis of Hungarian nationality politics 
and public utterances in the context of international (European) discourses on the past that 
have influenced Hungary since the 1980s. Two interactive processes in (western) Europe were 
taken into consideration: the change in the “regime of historicity” (Hartog, 2002) in the 1970s 
and the Europeanisation of Holocaust-memory. The construction of the problem as memory 
of expulsions is due to the interaction of these two processes. 
The essay proposes a periodisation according to typical configurations of discursive 
constraints and strategic identifications. In contrast to the widely accepted interpretation of the 
process as public speech on the “German past”, previously taboo under state socialist rule, 
became free, it puts emphasis on how actual discursive configurations are historically 
determined. The stigmatising label of “fascist nation” remained in use until 1983, and the 
state socialist regime at the same time imposed and institutionalised the Hungarian national 
category while at the same time it sanctioned “nationalism” of nationalities. Since the regime 
acknowledged the existence of the German nationality, and it supported the promotion of its 
language use and education in the mother tongue, strategic opposition to this normative order 
was scholarly discourse on nationalities on the one hand, and cultivation on the other. Both 
enabled to present German identity category as valuable in a very limited and ideologically 
controlled public domain.  
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The gradual integration of Hungary into the European political space modified this 
configuration in a way that it was the identification as “perpetrator nation” that the normative 
regime of commemoration and Holocaust memory imposed. Its interaction with the previous 
configuration resulted in the strategy of (self)-musealisation that is, presenting the past as 
cultural heritage and thus resignifying the stigmatised German identity-category. This study 
found that the recent European and German development of victimisation that refuses the 
position of “perpetrator” through representing expulsions as historical trauma has not become 
prevalent in Hungary. At the same time it argues that national stigmatising of Hungarian 
Germans practically ceased by the integration of the resettlements into the official national 
commemorative calendar.  
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